

Friedrich Nietzsche as A Freewill Advocate: Logical Derivations from the Concept of the “Death of God”

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Abstract

The paper is a response to the growing level of docility, laziness, despondency and superstition that arise from the religious determinist's belief in a divinely pre-programmed, pre-destined and God foreknown world. The problem associated with this belief system is that it does not allow human beings to see the need to rise in free human-saving actions in the face of difficulties, because it is held that the future and the end of every entity has been pre-destined by God. Hence, every human purport for freedom is a vacuous and an empty action already programmed by God. Although many scholars have written on the idea of the “death of God” in Nietzsche, none of them has been able to demonstrate that it was a reaction to religious determinism. The paper, therefore, demonstrates that Nietzsche's idea of the “death of God” was Nietzsche's way of opposing the idea of religious determinism. The paper adequately shows that the “death of God” in Nietzsche is a pragmatic instrument for the promotion of human freedom, which has been denied by the religious determinist. In place of God, Nietzsche offers the superman/overman as the goal of the evolution of human consciousness, a being with the capacity to overcome the decadence of existence. In adopting the position of Nietzsche as a solution to the limitations of religious determinism, the paper concluded that, Nietzsche did not advocate for anarchy but some sort of ‘unity of existential values’ in the attainment of the superman/overman by all as an existential objective.

Keywords: Nietzsche, God, Nihilism Freewill Determinism.

Introduction

Nietzsche's idea of the “death of God”, is a veritable tool for resolving the decadence of the religious determinist's worldview of a God pre-programmed, foreknown, and predestined world, yet, highly misunderstood. Many people are yet to realize that the “death of God” in Nietzsche's philosophy is a metaphor for the realization of human freedom. This is problematic since, if society had got a grip on this fact, it would not have continued to hold onto the religious determinist philosophy or theology of the church. This determinism encourages laziness towards duty, since it is believed that God had programmed all events. It means that those whom God has predestined to be rich must definitely become rich irrespective of their roles in the actualization of their destinies. The irony of the belief in determinism is that those whom God had destined to be armed robbers or criminals of different cadre may not do anything to change their destinies and fortunes. This indecision and resignation to fate has often ushered in a situation of hopelessness where an individual gives up on some bad situations that require his/her action to be remedied. Take, for instance, a “Jehovah's Witness” who refuses blood transfusion while lying on a hospital bed, under a critical death condition. This despondency and misery have enveloped many, yet they refuse to embrace and activate the

power of their will in rescuing themselves from this ill-fated religious determinism. Determinism ushers in a high degree of superstition. People are often deluded to think that God has programmed all events in the world. The problem with this thought pattern is that we cannot justify the aloofness of someone who has been predestined to kill his father, as in the case of Odewale in Ola Rotimi's *The Gods Are Not to Blame*. Odewale refused to stand aloof. He chose, instead, to struggle and change his ill-fated fortune. But to believe in predestination will mean that human beings should stand and watch such ill-fate being fulfilled. How can a father watch his young daughter die, without doing anything to save her life, simply because he believes that God gives and God takes, that God had predestined her to die? Again, this belief in determinism ushers in a level of economic hardship since most people refuse to work hard, thinking that it is God who provides. This group of people believe that it is God who makes the rich and the poor. In other words, some people have been predestined by God to be rich, while others have been predestined to be poor. To this group of people, hard work is unnecessary, since it does not change the plan of God.

In short, the age-old problem of free will and determinism is to be considered in part, and that is as it has to do with religious determinism. How can we claim that there is a God who has programmed all events in the world and also claim that the human being is a free moral agent? Amadi and Alawa (2018) demonstrate a Judeo-Christian chunk of this problem by citing (Jeremiah 1:5) "before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee and before thou comest (sic) out of the womb, I sanctified thee and have ordained thee a prophet unto the nations". The question, according to them, is, if God had predestined every action of humans, why then does the same Bible say that God left humans with the power to choose between good and evil? Again, in the book of Romans 8:30, the Bible says "Moreover whom he did predestinate, (sic) them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified: them he also glorified". This is a problem that scholars have pondered and reflected on. It is an ontological and logical problem whose foundation is rooted in incorrect abstraction and conceptualisation of God and human beings, and the forceful power of religion, as well as psychology. The same entity with barely the same attributes, incorrectly conceived as different entities that exist in different cosmoses, yet correlate in a manner that one is subordinated under the other. The solution to its resolution we find in Nietzsche's philosophy of the "death of God". The unique way of resolving this problem is to draw attention or shed light on Nietzsche's concept of the "death of God".

Logical Derivations from Nietzsche's Concept of the Death of God

Religious Determinism and its False Assumption of Religious Dualism

Nietzsche appears to be speaking to religious determinists when in *The Will to Power*, he wrote:

...when man experiences the conditions of power, the imputation is that he is not their cause, that he is not responsible for them: they come without being willed, consequently, we are not their author: the will is not free (i.e., the consciousness that we have been changed without having willed it) needs an external will"[1].

However, he gradually develops his philosophy into a philology of a disjointed but meaningful system. We shall begin our Nietzsche's lensed critique of religious determinism by examining the dualism of God and humans. All through the history of man, efforts have been made to account for the origin of man, as well as the origin of God. The conclusions reached have, in all cases, been a subject of controversy following the variegated nature of these interpretations. Without bothering to recount the different accounts and explanatory models, we align our thoughts with the Protagorean maxim "man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not"[2]. Our author, Nietzsche, has already led insight into the fact that God himself is a product of human creation, since human beings give essence to all entities (including God). We shall also attempt to demonstrate using Nietzsche's conception of God vis-à-vis the death of God and his concept of man (superman) on one hand, and our independent etymological analysis of the concepts of God and man on the other, to show that these two independent entities cannot cohabit in the same universe of consciousness. Ultimately, this section hopes to bridge the gap created by the bifurcation of entities into divine and human or God and human. This problem, as we have noted, is rooted in the traditional metaphysical notion of infinite regress. This certainly is one of the absolutes or fixations that Nietzsche attacked and killed by virtue of his idea of the "death of God". Now that God, the being in one of the clusters or realms of consciousness, is dead, we must collapse all structures of being into a monism of being. This monism of being is the monism of humanity, the monism of the superman[3].

What is quite clear, even to the visually impaired, is the fact that Nietzsche's conception of the origins

and natures of God and human being is that Nietzsche rejects the Judeo-Christian concept of religious dualism and religious determinism where God, the creator of man, inhabits heaven and human beings, his creation, inhabit the earth. Yet, in this Judeo-Christian religious dualism envisaged by the religious determinists, there exist a form of interactionism in the form of prayer. We have recused ourselves from the horrors and terrors of repeating all the theories since our unpened reflection reveals that what will emerge from any such exercise is two-wide-prong perspectives on the issue depending on the accessors leaning. A prong begins their argument with human beings as the cornerstone. This group which may be historically traced to Protagoras and his co-sophists and still found in contemporary day existentialism argues that all that, be it history, being, God, substance or nature began with human consciousness. Human beings exist first, and then create their essences. Nietzsche himself belongs to this group. Nietzsche argues that God is a psychological product of man born out of fear, despair and trembling. He Criticizes Christianity for presenting the posture of God as someone who perceives children as fallible beings, and enjoins humans not to work. How can we have a God who encourages laziness?

Essentially, for Nietzsche, the true nature of God as well as that of man was not well captured in the Christian conceptual framework. Christianity presents itself as a religion which seeks justice, yet, metes out injustice by sacrificing the innocent, a religion which seeks to save humanity yet, enslaves it by glorifying pity, dependence and virtue. According to him, God was created by man as a way of solving their psychological needs. This God, in serving the human need, has become a problem onto human being his maker, as he now imposes values on man. There is now so many thou shall nots. There is therefore a need to “kill God”. And killing God involves a psychological process of recovering the part of man that was projected as a surge in the person of God. What Nietzsche meant by the death of God, therefore, is a revaluation of values by which he meant that we stay true to the earth. As Salter puts it “stay true to the earth he exclaims, and lead the virtue that has flown away from the earth back to it, back to body and life”[4]. Being not satisfied with the person and nature of God as captured above, and realizing the deficit in man which arose out of his creation of God, while also solving the original problem of fear, despair and trembling which led man to create God, Nietzsche proposed the superman as a solution. That is, a man that is man and God onto himself. A man that is not weak, as conceived by the Christian religion. A man that is not just strong, but is super-strong. However, a deeper reflection on the whole question of man and their philosophical approach raises some other questions. What is man? or to satisfy the feminist quest, what is a human being? “The savage or the one that is called rational or thinking, Homo sapiens?”[5]. On the opposite pole stand those who begin their race course by placing God at the position of their first cause. We shall not end this elegy of reflection without an acknowledgement of the third pole – fideism (compatibilism).

What is God? The term “God” has different connotations to diverse people. However, a utilitarian democratisation of the concept, particularly within the Judeo-Christian language game, conceives God as the creator of the universe. That is, the beginning and the end of creation. One of their prominent voices and former Archbishop of Canterbury, St. Anselm, defines God as “the greatest conceivable of all beings”. By this conceptualisation, God is perceived as the greatest and most perfect of every entity. Beings are graded according to their degree of perfection. However, this conception is laden with some form of internal contradiction, since this greatest conceivable entity is conceived by another entity presumed to be lower in rank to it. The problem then arises: how can an imperfect mind conceive of a perfect mind? It is this problem that led many, like Nietzsche, to stray into arguing that God is a product of man, born out of the psychology of fear and trembling. Let us at this point, examine the internal constituents of the word ‘God’, beginning with its etymology. That is, what are the individual characteristics of the concept and personhood of God as implicit in its original word? The word ‘God’ etymologically derives from the Greek ‘deus’ (deus or divus), which literally means divine or descended. Its chief root word is Dyeus or deiwos, which means celestial or shining and denotes the proto-Indo-European pantheon. That is, it is seen as the representative of all the European Gods. Its Hebrew equivalent is ‘Yahweh’ (Exodus 24:1-8, Exodus 33:18). This is the God of the Israelites who again descended from the cloud. The word ‘God’ is a German equivalent of the term ‘guthan’ ‘gud’ or ‘Gothic’, which literally means that which is invoked. From its etymology, therefore, we find that God is either conceived as the descended one, the celestial one or the invoked one. In any case, there still needs to be someone who gives this characterisation to God. That is, someone must conceive of it as divine, celestial or invoke it. It is this exercise of freedom of perception, conception and involution that has resulted in the many different characterisations of God to the point that human beings subjugate their being under the

being of God. All such appellations as perfection, eternal, immortal, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent are all human linguistic constructs created to decorate the entity God. If not, how can we account for the fact that an omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent, perfect and benevolent (all-loving) God will create human beings that are corrupt, imperfect, ephemeral and mutable?

What remains to be said is that a critical assessment of the Judeo-Christian conception of God as the only free being, the alpha and omega of actions, opens up another vista of learning and understanding. A vista which validates the lordship of God[15]. The word 'lord' is etymologically rooted in the Latin *dominus* or the Greek *kyrios*, which literally means a master of a household, ruler, feudal lord. Husband or God. Principally, God is considered the lord because of the assumed unlimited freedom he has as the creator, ruler, husband and keeper of the world[6].

Now what is man? Or what is a human being? The term 'human' was first used in the mid-13th century. It was derived from the French word 'humain' which in turn was derived from the Latin 'humanus' which was a sub-derivation of the word's 'man' and 'humus' meaning a hybrid relative of *homo* and earth, respectively. It follows from this consideration that man or human being is a hybrid kind of *homo sapiens* species that inhabits, lords and rules over the earth (<http://www.vocabulary.com> – human). However, P. N. Fedoseyev tends to accord man the authoritative representative and playmaker role of the human race when he argues that "philosophy presents man as a social being capable of acting and thinking in a definite historical age in accordance with his general human nature. Philosophy strives to develop a view of man that would reflect everything that makes him an authoritative representative of the human race"[7]. Meanwhile, there is a view that seeks to unite God with humanity. This view is compatible with the Judeo-Christian account of the mission and vision of Christ on earth. That is, an account that makes God an incarnate of man or human. Karl Barth attempts a synthesis of the divine and human components of being when he tells us to allow conscience to speak, for it is the perfect interpreter of life. Conscience speaks of the righteousness of God. "And now the conscience tells us of the last and deepest essence of all things is such a will – that God is righteous. We live by knowing this".

God, though conceived by him as a divine entity, is made manifest in man or, again, respecting the feminist stand, human beings. Gabriel Okara also speaks of the role of the conscience as the guardian of man. "Okolo ran and as he ran past, a voice held him. Come in,' it said, come in quickly. In Okolo went instinctively and in the glom, stood panting". This was the voice of conscience speaking. However, Okara also decries the dialectical nature of the voice of conscience, but maintains that the voice of conscience is the voice that speaks from inside. "Okolo wanted to go out but he had two opposing voices speaking in his inside. One said 'go' and the other said 'stay', ..." [8]. In all, flowing from our etymological analysis of the concepts and attributes of God and man, our hermeneutic sense of argumentation presents to us one common attribute or unit of characterisation between God and man. And that is freedom. God is freedom. That is, an independent being who rules and lords over his affairs and the affairs of the celestial and heavenly entities[9]. Man is also a free being. Free lord and man of his own earthly affairs. Freedom, therefore, becomes the defining characteristic of God and man. Any attempt to devoice freedom from man, he dies as he died in Wole Soyinka's *The Man Died*. The only difference and, in our thinking, the major problem with all previous analyses on the lordship of God is the attempt to accord him rulership of the earthly bodies (including human beings). For us God and man are the same in nature since they are free entities, but different in that their lordship or manhood is manifested in different realms of consciousness and habitat. Going by the Judeo-Christian conception and consciousness of God, God dwells in heaven. This is the spiritual realm, and since God is the spiritual aspect of the same entity, he should lord over all spiritual entities that inhabit or dwell in heaven. On the other hand, man as the bodily or empirical aspect of the same entity should lord and man over all entities that inhabit the earth and all its material sphere or realm[10]. The "death of God" in Nietzsche, therefore, implies a disconnect between the divine and the human realms of consciousness. By the "death of God", the connection (breath) that sustains the relationship between God and Man was cut off. Man became man unto himself, and God became God unto himself. None of them lord or rules over the sphere of the other. This does not necessarily mean that there are two different worlds of consciousness, nor does it connote dualism. It simply means the denial of the false psychological world of illusion created by God and the denial of the object or subject God. Man remains the measure of all things[11].

In all, what we have done so far is to demonstrate the errors inherent in the Judeo-Christian conceptualisation of God as well as that of man, since these faulty conceptualisations is at the foundation of

the religious determinists' criterion of meaningfulness. As implicit in Nietzsche's philosophy which we have seen, religious determinism and its defenders anchor their hope for a future in a "dead God" who has predestined the future of all entities and still manifest this predestination through his attribute of foreknowledge and omniscience. Nietzsche's argument that God is a psychological product of man provides us the ground to repudiate the consciousness of religious dualism upon which the religious determinists have built their edifice. With the "death of God" and the entrenchment of the human will, determinism is not only nailed to the cross of death but also buried in the same coffin with God. Being, therefore, remains human or to support Nietzsche, the superman[12].

Again, we must address this problem by introducing a theory that, in our view, resolves these internal contradictions that exist between any Judeo-Christian conceptualisation of the words 'God' and 'man' (human being). This theory is the unity of existential values by which we recognise that every history begins and ends with human consciousness. And that superhuman entities have a nature that can naturally generate a uniform value system since superhumans themselves have the same nature. Like Protagoras, Kant, and Nietzsche have made us to understand, any abstraction or cognition that goes beyond "the bounds of sense" or that is not true to the earth is naturally absurd and vacuous. Most causal explanatory models premise their account of the origin of God on the problem of infinite regression. Like Aristotle, God becomes the efficient cause or unmoved mover of the universe. But all such accounts fail to acknowledge the emptiness or vacuousness in proceeding beyond the bounds of sense. It amounts to a shadow chase for anyone to begin to talk of infinite regress when the human is in itself an eternal being and existential being, the creator, as well as end of all knowledge. Eternal beings in the sense that they are the beginning of the existential circle. We agree with Hume and later Kant that the quest to go beyond humanity is a natural quest. However, we also think that the knowledge of the unity of existential value is a knowledge of the vacuousness of infinite regression. We strongly think that this natural drive to go beyond humanity is not only being triggered by fear and trembling, but the fear of death. However, we must as philosophers realise that death is a passing on and not the end of humanity. In admonishing us to stay true to earth, Nietzsche was simply recognising the truism of existential determinism. Nietzsche was not only right in saying that God was a psychological product of man born out of the nauseated fear and trembling, he was also pragmatically correct in "killing God" by limiting all cognition of entities to human all too human. In the concept of unity of existential values is also embedded the concept of freewill since man does not have a cause, it follows that he is in-charge of his own affairs. This Kills the idea of religious determinism, since it eliminates the idea of God as the programmer or foreseer of his future[14].

Unity of existential values as a philosophical theory that fills the vacuum created by the dilemma of freewill and determinism holds that it is through the existential struggles of the human person to engage the challenges and decadence in the world that essences are created. Human beings exist and thereafter create their essences. However, through engaging the fixed and absolute values and laws, human beings establish their essence. Freedom is born through this struggle to "kill God" and all absolutes[15]. Most importantly, these individual superhuman beings by virtue of their natures as super beings, create an essence that unites society in value choices. The human confrontation of the sufferings, pains and perils of life results in the "death of God" and all absolutes that impose pain and take away freedom from them. That perhaps accounts for the constant referral to pain, suffering and pessimism by Nietzsche. Bertrand Russell, one of the most critical philosophers of all time, says he dislikes Nietzsche for his constant contemplation of pain, erecting conceit into duty and admiring conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die. According to him, the ultimate argument against Nietzsche's philosophy, as "against any unpleasant but internally self-consistent ethics, lies not in an appeal to fact, but in an appeal to the emotions". He adds that Nietzsche hates universal love[16],[17],[18].

Russell hopes that Nietzsche's attendant influence on his followers will come to an end soon. What Russell did not take into account was that Nietzsche's discussions on pain and suffering were not prescriptive in the sense of urging people to seek after pain and suffering; rather, it was merely descriptive, in the sense of acknowledging the nature of the existential struggles as filled with pain and suffering. He urges us to confront these sufferings and pain, for it is through it that we will consummate and affirm our life. Again, Russell's criticism of Nietzsche's admiration of conquerors was not well placed. This is because Nietzsche's admiration of the strong or the conqueror, rather than the weak, was a way of stating his disdain for religious determinism, since religious determinism accords to God the qualities of the conqueror and relegates human

beings to the position of the weak. The same Christian religion urges its followers to be meek in spirit and to show mercy and pity. On the point that this virtue of pride and conqueror's strength leads to the cleverness upon which men die, Russell realizes that the entire vision and mission of Nietzsche as a philosophical prophet is the salvation of humanity as encapsulated in the title of his book *Human, All Too Human*. No passage in Nietzsche's numerous philosophical works tends to suggest that Nietzsche is anti-human nor wishes humanity death. Instead, he advocates a human life-affirming philosophy that "kills God" his rival. Nietzsche rather thinks that all those qualities and attributes accorded to God should be accorded to the human being. Human beings should aspire to be conquerors; they should aspire to be strong and free rather than weak. This is the only way to affirm and consummate his being. But all these qualities are not accorded to the human person by the religious determinists. In this sense, Nietzsche is the true Christian because he encourages human beings to aspire for the attributes accorded God by Christians and not the purported Christians who idolise decadent virtues such as humility, pity, and laziness[19],[20],[21].

For us, the area we may fault Nietzsche is in the area of his proposal of the superman/overman. We fault him not because he did not offer a solid and an existentially well-grounded replacement of God (superman/overman), but because he appears not to have taken note that human entities or his superman/overman must exist in community/society. Hence, there is the need to address in a better fashion, the issue of morality. By this we mean that Nietzsche's Nihilism is not foolproof. It only addresses the moral issues that arise at the level of the subjective individualism of the same, but fail to address the moral issues that arises at the level of the communal and social interaction. Superhuman, having assumed their real nature, must be able to unite themselves in a society of superhuman

. A society of communal living, a society of unity of purpose and unity of thoughts. Even though Nietzsche did not pay attention to this shortfall of his characterisation of the superman, it can be accommodated in our theory as a remedy of Nietzsche's superman. What we add to Nietzsche's theory of the superman/overman is an expansion of the already existing theory. We realise that this unity of existential values and morality is possible because at the level of the superman/overman, there is a unity of purpose. This unity of purpose entails that all human beings possess the same rational capacity, the same moral values, the same lure and undertake the same risk and challenges. It is this unity of thought, unity of value and unity of risk that will allow for unity of morality[22],[23],[24].

Unity of Existential values, therefore, argues for the unity of values delivered by Nietzsche through his conceptualisation of the superman/overman. It aspires to domesticate the strength and courage of God in the human person. It encourages humans to confront the decadence in life. Those who refuse to engage the decadence in society by refusing to struggle against the slave and master moralities already established also creates their own essences. A life-negating essence is created by them freely. Such people cannot deny the fact that they freely chose to be stooges of religion, morality or God. Unity of existential values is, therefore a call for thinkers and philosophers to be mad like Nietzsche by continuing the announcement of not just the "death of God" but several other deaths. While not denying the fact that Nietzsche fell ill at some point, we have also argued that the question of madness suffered by Nietzsche was a social libel placed on him by theists for having the courage to announce the "death of God" which was considered the greatest of the untouchable values. This was simply because Nietzsche had the audacity and courage to confront the God-figure in a Darwinian cum existential struggle of the survival of the fittest. In the end, Nietzsche survived but "God died". Nietzsche did not just end up as a superman who "killed God", he also became the overman who took the place of God. As Philosophers, therefore, we must realise that it is our "duty's sake" to kill values and give birth to new ones. And we must think along the lines of William James' thoughts, that adversaries to our new ideas and against our onslaughts on God will come after us to libel us 'mad people'. We are therefore preacher and priests ordained to bring through the nihilistic messages of Nietzsche to the world. What message do we bring, therefore, the message that humanity has been resurrected from the grave and in its place God, his adversary, has been killed and buried. That is to say, that religious determinism has been killed by Nietzsche and his likes (including us) and free will resurrected from the grave hard[25].

Religious Determinism: The Murderer of Humanity

Another very serious grudge we hold against religious determinists is their attempt to murder humanity through the denial of free will. By conceiving of God as the programmer of the future events in society, religious determinists murdered humanity. How? As we see in Nietzsche and Sartre's conception of

the human person, freedom is the essence of humanity. To take it away from the human person is to kill that one. What the religious determinists have done to humanity through their denial of human freedom is to murder humanity. Any admission, adoption or amplification of the religious determinist's thesis is a reduction of the human person to mere stones and other material entities incapable of action and decision. But in Nietzsche's "death of God" is a renaissance of humanity. The "death of God" simply means the birth of freedom. Not just freedom of human entities, but freedom as a being. A freedom made manifest in the nature, character and person of the overman. By implication, human entities by virtue of the "death of God" now possess the strong will and power to go beyond the original boundaries created for them by God. The many "thou shalt nots" and boundaries created against human beings collapsed with the "death of God". Man, not only possesses the power and will to become supermen, but also the freedom and the inherent tendencies to become overmen. By this we mean that with the "death of God" all the barriers and limitations placed against human entities died. Those barriers that stops them from creating their own values, but to admit and exist by the values created by God are now dead. Those values that accords to God the ownership and lordship of heaven and earth died and the lordship of the earth conferred on humans (supermen). Those values that extols a being other than human died. Recall that one of the contradictions which we had set out to resolve is the question of whether humans are free agents or determined to act in the way they do.

Allied to this inquiry is that which we have attempted to resolve in the preceding section. That is, how a spiritual entity can control the affairs of material entities. Recall also that it was because of this problem that Gilbert Ryle attacked Cartesian philosophy in general and his mind-body problem in particular by deducing two major fallacies which are: Category mistake and the ghost in the machine. According to Ryle, it is a category mistake to think that we can compare two different entities of different nature and whose habitat are in different realms. How can we think that we can place a ghost which is a spiritual entity in a machine which is a bodily or material entity and compare them or expect the machine to dictate the ghost? Akin to this issue is the puzzle how can we argue that God is a free agent and that he created human agents, but these agents are not free agents in themselves? This certainly will translate to saying that a creature of God was not created in the image and nature of God. Since part of the entailment of being created in the image of God is that the creature must poses the nature, qualities and character of the creator which in this instance is freedom. Again, as we showed earlier, if we still grant that God and human beings are free moral agents, we cannot sustain the argument that they both co-exist in the same universe of consciousness. It is for this reason that Nietzsche did not just stop at proposing the "death of God" but also initiating the process of the birth of the superman (overman). The other problem or shortfall of religious determinism, which is closely related to the first one (the false assumption of religious dualism), therefore, is the rejection of Absolute freedom. Religious determinists by their denial of human freewill murdered humanity. It is because of them that Nietzsche came to rescue humanity. This is derivable from different strands of Nietzsche's ideas such as his conception of the superman, the will to power and nihilism. Our reading of Nietzsche's shows that Nietzsche came to save humanity from the onslaught of the religious determinists. In the following passage we see Nietzsche addressing religious determinists:

...when man experiences the conditions of power, the imputation is that he is not their cause, that he is not responsible for them: they come without being willed, consequently, we are not their author: the will is not free (i.e., the consciousness that we have been changed without having willed it) needs an external will" (Nietzsche, 1967a, p. 86).

In the preceding section, we succeeded in establishing that one of the problems of religious determinism is the bifurcation of the human realms of consciousness into two, where God represent the subconscious realm. Of course, we also showed that the "death of God" in Nietzsche killed the connection between the divine and the human. Talking of the autonomy of human entities as a fallout of the "death of God" in Nietzsche, Nietzsche tells us that "man, raised to titanic proportion, conquers his own civilisation and compels the gods to join forces with him, since by his autonomous wisdom he commands both their existence and the limitations of their sway". Freedom and courage are fundamental values of Nietzsche's Übermensch (superman, or overman) in whom Nietzsche reposes the confidence and hope for a better tomorrow. "Do you have courage, oh my brothers? Are you brave of heart? Not courage before witnesses, but the courage of hermits and eagles, which not even a god looks at anymore". Here, Nietzsche was talking of the courage to create new possibilities, the courage and self-confidence of eagles and hermits to fly higher

and higher to the land of impossibilities. The courage that looks at the self as creator of destiny and not that one that sees God as the programmer of the universe. Nietzsche was clear enough on his goal of rebutting the determinist stance on human destiny when he wrote, “what is effeminate, what comes from the servant’s ilk and especially the rabble mishmash: that now wants to become ruler of all human destiny—oh nausea! Nausea! Nausea!”. This rabble mishmash here refers to the determinists God. Human beings are sick to rely on a God-determined fortune rather than overcoming the decadent human to become the superman or overman. Hence, he encourages us to enthrone the reign of the superman. Freedom and courage are not necessarily flowery, juicy and favourable actions of conformism, but often tough, resistant decisions of pain and torture.

Freedom is not essentially an inward state (that is, having to do with our loyalties, beliefs and commitments) as we find in Kierkegaardian philosophy, but about our actions. It has to do with our voluntary choices. It was these nonconformist intent and content of freedom that led the Nazis to adopt Nietzsche’s philosophy. To show how Nietzsche values and hoped to resolve the problem of free will and determinism, Nietzsche recounts the terrible triadic dilemma of the Oedipian fates as captured by Sophocles in *Oedipus Rex* and later adapted by Ola Rotimi in *The Gods Are Not To Blame*. In his words: “This is the recognition I find expressed in the terrible triad of Oedipian fates: the same man who solved the riddle of nature (the ambiguous Sphinx) must also, as murderer of his father and husband of his mother, break the consecrated tables of the natural order. From Nietzsche’s perspective, the whole idea of liberty and the concept of awareness relating thereof invariably results in the conception of goal as the grounding for human actions. Nietzsche tilts his philosophy towards the free will prong of the debate. However, religious determinism and all fatalism that the being of God affords is still relevant in that they provide the superman (human beings) with the existential grounds for the struggles for the actualisation of the self. There is, therefore, for Nietzsche, an anthropomorphic conception of existence. It was this anthropomorphic conception of reality that Kaag was referring to when he argues along the line of Hesse that Nietzsche “was not interested in harbouring a single immortal soul but rather a variety of mortal ones”. He enjoins us to remain authentic beings. “Become who you are: it has been described as the most haunting of Nietzsche’s haunting aphorisms. It expresses an abiding paradox at the core of human selfhood: either you are who you are already, or you become someone other than who you are”. But this idea of authenticity was not contemplated by the religious determinists, since in their views, the life we live is not our own, we do not have the first say nor the final say on how it should be lived. All such decisions, according to them, have been predetermined by God and through his foreknowledge he monitors its fruition. Nietzsche simply says be true to earth. Implying that God is meaningful only to the extent that it serves the purpose of humanity and not the other way around.

Another problem associated with the religious determinist’s view is the attempt to accord to human beings all decadent attributes. Human beings are said to be fallible beings, mutable entities, weak, and short-sighted. It takes the “death of God”, as evidenced in Nietzsche’s concept of the superman, to transform the nature of the human person from fallibility to infallibility, weakness to strength and humility to pride. Recall that a strong man (superman) in Nietzsche’s philosophical construction is not one who does not have limitations but one who has developed the will to overcome his own limitations. The “death of God” therefore energised human beings (decadent man) to the point that it recovers its psychological self. The self that considers itself as a creator of solutions to its problems and challenges. Recall also that human entities prior to the “death of God” was characterised by the nature of decadence. This decadent man was an embodiment of the degraded will to power and a kind of history. This man approximates the Heideggerian inauthentic being, while the Nietzschean superman is an equivalent of the Heideggerian authentic being.

Religious Determinism: The murderer of Science and Technology

Religious determinism, in its rejection of the human will’s capacity and ability to gain objective (unprogrammed) knowledge, murders science and technology. Science here means organized and systematised body of knowledge. Religious determinism fails to accord the human person the creative will and power to organise their own affairs. The human mind is not only a Lockean tabula rasa, but also the will in bondage. Its capacity to produce knowledge is only dependent on the divine illumination of this will. By the religious determinists characterisation of the human will, it follows that the will is only a perceived observer of the divine manifestations of the programmed events by God. Rather than the will playing an active and productive role in knowledge acquisition as in Cartesian philosophy or a mechanical role as in the

Lockean and Deweyan experimental procedures, the mind only stands aloof to the workings of the divine will, and barely does nothing in contributing to human comfort through science and technology. This religious determinist consciousness has hindered technological development and growth since it fails to recognize the will's capacity to develop certain technological and infrastructural goods to enhance the living conditions of the human person. But with the "death of God" in Nietzsche, science and logic was born. That is to say, there was a rebirth of science and logic. Both science and technology began to spring from the ingenuity of the existential human. That is, existentialism became humanism or humanism began to exist, rather than some fixated metaphysical abstractions that we find in most philosophies particularly, that of Socrates and his pupil Plato that Nietzsche unleashed the terrors of his pen on. "The discoveries of science, technology and exploration were drastically expanding and changing the way people perceived and understood the world". In contemporary times, we see the dinosaurs as one good example of the discoveries that the Biblical account of Genesis does not accommodate. (Cogswell 2008, p. 9). Not just science as the explanation or unveiling of natural phenomena, but science as the nihilistic unveiling of the same. By nihilistic unveiling of the same we mean, arriving at truth, or reality through different, creative or novel processes. This is what Nietzsche calls eternal recurrence.

As Felix-Nestor Ahoyo rightly observed that "the structures of the will to power are science, knowledge, art, politics..." (p. xvi). The "death of God" was propelled by the human will for the transvaluation of all values, of which the "death of God" was its high point. To appreciate the concept of scientific Nihilism as a fallout of the "death of God," we shall first articulate for your appreciation the traditional metaphysics of the will to power as well as the concept of metaphysical nihilism. The metaphysics of the will to power is an institution of values whose novelty consists of a transvaluation of all values. Reality unearths itself through the conscious struggles of the will (self). Here the will is not considered as the subject of consciousness that produces ideas as we find in Cartesian philosophy, neither is it the Kantian synthetic eyeglass (categories) of consciousness that gives meanings to entities, but simply as the propelling forces of existential struggles. Will, here, is reduced to the attributes and tendencies in a human entity that propel him/her to carry out a volitional action. Simply put, will is the rational and existential tendency for freewill or freedom. Nietzsche tells us that:

The victorious concept 'force' by means of which our physicist have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as 'will to power', i.e, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc.

In the same book, he tells us that nihilism means "that the highest values devalue themselves". That is to say that there is no answer or at best absolute answer for the question "why?" which was the preoccupation of traditional metaphysics. According to him, there is radical nihilism which consists in the conviction that the untenability of absolute existence, particularly when it comes to the highest values one recognises, together with the understanding that we lack the minimum right to posit an entity, either beyond or behind, that is divine or morally incarnate. Ahoyo was therefore correct in his interpretation of Nietzsche's Nihilism, thus:

This term nihilism does not mean in the Nietzschean understanding nil and nothingness, that every will and every work should be vain. In Nietzsche, it is neither a doctrine nor an opinion. It does not mean the dissolution of everything into nothingness. With Nietzsche, it means that the supreme values are devalued, there is no end, there is not any answer for the question why? Nihilism is the process of devaluation of the then supreme values" (p. xvi).

Scientific Nihilism is our language for the scientific process of devaluing these fixed and absolute values. This concept, we think, will be better appreciated after a hermeneutic analysis of the two independent words 'science' and 'nihilism'. As we stated earlier, by science we do not mean the empirical unveiling or explanation of natural phenomena, but the unveiling of reality through the Feyerabendian scientific anarchism. Nietzsche tells us that "it is not the victory of science that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science" (p. 261). He goes on to argue that the method, rather than science itself, is the most valuable and that the valuable methods are those that devalue themselves. This is exactly why he attacked previous philosophies, such as those of Socrates, Plato, Descartes, Kant, etc, and tilted his philosophy towards that of Heraclitus. Fixation is therefore not an essential attribute of reality or

truth. The method must admit of some iota of flexibility. So, in talking of science, here, we are only interested in this method of anarchism, creativity, novelty or flexibility. The second word is nihilism to which implies that there is no end or finality to truth. Truth or realities will forever be in an unending circle of devaluation and transvaluation (eternal recurrence). In talking of scientific nihilism, therefore, we are talking of a scientific attitude that is not fixed, but flexible; a method that is not final, but continues to devalue itself in time.

Religious Determinism: A Malignant Desecrator of the Human Will

As Ridley observed, “during the twentieth century determinism was a term of abuse, and genetic determinism was the kind”. He bushes this point further with an extract from William James' philosophy, which demonstrates that the word cause' is an alter to an unknown god. But what he did not capture was the attendant philosophical views that incubated this negation of determinism through to its foundation – causality. This rejection of determinism, including Ridley's readmission of it via nurture, was precipitated and incubated by Nietzsche's thoughts on the “death of God”. As we saw earlier, Nietzsche was speaking to religious determinists when in *The Will to Power*, He wrote:

...when man experiences the conditions of power, the imputation is that he is not their cause, that he is not responsible for them: they come without being willed, consequently, we are not their author: the will is not free (i.e., the consciousness that we have been changed without having willed it) needs an external will”.

It follows that Nietzsche believes in the human person rather than God. Now that God is dead, what is left of the foreknowledge of God? Who is it now that predestines events? Definitely, Superman is the answer. Nietzsche was himself worried by the presuppositions of religious determinism. How can religious determinism presume that human destinies were implanted in humans by God? How can religious determinism, which feeds and nourishes on the being of God, remain alive when God, its source of life, is dead and buried? Recall that Nietzsche did not only tell us of the “death of God”, but also of his burial and decomposition.

Do we still hear nothing of the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we still smell nothing of the divine decomposition? – Gods, too, decompose! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How can we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! The holiest and the mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us? With what water could we clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the magnitude of this deed not too great for us?

It was for reasons of the latter part of this citation that Christian apologetics wrongly interpreted the “death of God” in Nietzsche to mean or to have been precipitated by the fall of moral standards of behaviour. But what Nietzsche meant was that that which appears to be the greatest value of the world, that which appears untouchable, has been killed and buried such that there is no more untouchable or great ideal as was posited by all previous philosophies of Socrates, Plato et al. This is exactly why in *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche chose to react to the views of Ree. Recall that Ree is one of the religious determinists who believes that human entities are not free moral agents. Nietzsche tells us that he has never dissented any book the way he thoroughly disagreed with Ree's book titled *The Origin of Moral Perception*. The controversial Nietzsche tells us that his aim was not to controvert Ree's thesis, but to replace Ree's errors with his own errors. Of course, you should know by now that Nietzsche was simply trying to play down his nature as a controversial philosopher. He actually was interested at that material time to downplay and refute the value of traditional morality by offering a religious foundation to these moral categories. God and his position have to be replaced by the Superman. That is why in what follows the penultimate citation, Nietzsche asks if we should not aspire to become gods ourselves? He answers in the affirmative to this question and further extols this deed of murdering God. According to him, “There was never a greater deed – and whoever is born after us will on account of this deed belong to a higher history than all history up to now!” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 120). Now that God has died, buried and decomposed, it is no longer fashionable to talk of determinism since he who determines is dead, buried and decomposed. It follows that one of the implications of the “death of God”

is the death of religious determinism since the leaves of a tree cannot be said to be alive when the tree is dead. As a matter of fact, the death of the tree is first manifested by the death of its leaves. With the “death of God” in Nietzsche, the freewill-determinism debate is not only dead, but also buried just as God was buried by Nietzsche in *The Gay Science*.

A closely related problem of religious determinism to the desecration of the human will being discussed is the imposition of absolute morals by this foreknowing, predestinarian God of determinism. It amounts to an insult on the human will to expect it to stand aloof or align with divine commands as moral categories of judgement. Recall also that Nietzsche attacked Christian morality for promoting what he calls slave morality rather than master morality. How can God impose on us a morality that exhorts the weak and demonizes the strong? How could society degenerate to the point that it adopts sympathy and pity as preached by the preacher-men to become a norm? The good thing is that now that the being that imposes this weak moral standard on society is dead and buried, such moral categories and thou shalt nots will all die. Man, or supermen becomes the standard and creators of moral laws and categories.

Religious Determinism: A Catalyst for Human Laziness, Despondency and Superstitious Belief

The Religious determinists’ defence of God’s foreknowledge and predestination, has incubated and materialized a dangerous chunk of laziness. If truly human events and consequences have been predestined to the extent envisaged by the Judeo-Christian conceptualization of religious determinism where human beings can do nothing to change this good or ill-fated destiny, why should human beings worry themselves in labour to change or create a better future and fortune for themselves? Certainly, the belief in religious determinism catalyses and crystallises laziness to the extent that humans resign their quest for being and struggle for existence to the divine, whom they conceive as “the great provider”. Human efforts in the quest for survival struggles, particularly in fending for their daily bread, is demotivated by this religious deterministic consciousness. This is exactly why Nietzsche says that human beings have lost themselves in the search for God. In fact, as we have shown in one of the above citations from Nietzsche, Nietzsche was worried that we have a god who tells us not to work again. His exact words are: “a wise man who calls upon us to work no more”. The religious determinists’ compatibilism of continued human struggles in the face of predestination and God’s foreknowledge is not only incoherent but also imprudent, hence rejected. We must therefore seize the opportunity provided by Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of the “death of God” to activate the human will in pursuit of his daily bread. We must also see in Nietzsche’s “death of God”, the death of the great provider and a possibility of the superman to become the great provider. To be down to earth is to return all the accolades poured on God to human. Human beings become the great physician, the only hope for existence.

Again, as we see in Heidegger and Magnus’ analysis and interpretation of the Nietzschean concept and person of Zarathustra as the convalescent. “The convalescent is the man who collects himself to return home, that is to turn in, into his own destiny”. Religious determinism’s projection of a destiny programmed by God is now questioned by Nietzsche, rather than talk of a divine destiny or programme now talks of a destiny created by human. A destiny that does not go beyond the individual, a destiny that was not predestined by any supernatural deity, but that created by the individual human person through his/her life affirming suffering and pessimistic struggles for existence.

In our contemporary society, we observe serious superstition which in our view, springs from the religious determinists’ belief in a supernatural deity. Human beings now look away from themselves as the being of creation. But with the “death of God”, in Nietzsche, the real meaning of Zarathustra needs be enunciated, the home coming and looking inwards of humans must be made manifest. This home-coming means for Nietzsche, a return to the reign of existentialism. For us, it means the return to existential determinism. A world only programmed by human beings through their struggles for survival. Now that “God is dead”, all our hope in him have turned to hopelessness. To believe in a “dead God” is to be superstitious. We must therefore revert all our hopes and trust to the superhuman. To the human who is human and more. To the human, the creator of creation. We must turn to the one whom we can see and run to in times of need, not by turning to another, but by turning to the same, the self, and the one individual existential determiner.

Conclusion

The religious determinists consciousness that conceives a divinely predestined and foreknown world is laden with many defects and inconsistencies. Firstly, it parades a faulty religious dualism that prides God as the creator and perfect arm of being. This God lives in heaven which is the habitat for all perfect and immutable entities. On the other hand, human entities represent the second cluster class of this religious dualism, representing the mutable, imperfect, and fallible aspect of reality. Yet, it claims that human beings put on the nature of God and communicate with God and God also put on the nature of man through Jesus Christ, the incarnate of the father. Religious determinism murders humanity through its refusal to tap from the well-stocked content of the human mind. It's denial and lack of will to tap from the reservoir of power or the faculty of understanding is tantamount to a reductionism of the human entity to a mere vegetable. Even though we grant creationism, the view that God created human entities and reject evolutionism, the view that human entities developed through an evolutionary process of natural selection, of biologism and speciesism, it will remain an issue to explain how God who lives in heaven is said to be an omnipresent being. At the same time, he maintains a form of interactionism in the nature of prayer with human beings who is said to live in the earthly sphere and is full of limitations. Besides the problems associated with this religious dualism, religious determinism hinders the development of science and technology. Its non-emphasis on human abilities, method and freewill seriously hinders the development of science and technology. That is, as a result of the religious determinists' belief in a pre-programmed and divinely foreknown world, human beings do not strive again to create some new facilities and technologies that will enhance their existential conditions.

Also, the religious determinists' denial of freewill malignantly desecrates the human will since, it makes nonsense of the will. If God created human beings and gave them reason, (the will power) could God have given them this will power for them not to use it? If we grant the religious determinists' creationist theory, why then do we reduce the human will as a passive watcher of God's programmed and foreknown events? If God created us in his own image and God the creator is a free God, why are human beings his creation not free? All these questions point to the fact that religious determinisms rejection of the human will is not logically grounded. Furthermore, religious determinism catalyses and crystallizes laziness to duty. How can a human being be spurred to work hard and fend for himself when God is already conceived as the great provider. And has also programmed some people to be poor in society and others to be rich? What benefit will working hard and planting bring to the table, if God has already programmed the harvest to be fruitless or fruitful? Obviously, religious determinism breeds a form of despondency and superstition. Jonathan Edward vacuousness of freedom is here upturned, to vacuousness of determinism. A determinism of emptiness.

Nietzsche's analysis of the "death of God" is considered a reaction to the emptiness of the religious determinist stance on a God-foreknown and God programmed universe. Previous philosophers had metaphysically abstracted God as the causal principle of the world. This metaphysical God was latter decorated with the toga of the programmer and foreknower of the world and the entities therein, including the events in the world. But Nietzsche through the idealization of the "death of God", called for a return to humanity. He attached the concept of God as conceived by the religious determinists; hence, it represents the greatest of the absolute, untouchable and unquestionable principles. For Nietzsche, determinism, hampers and hinders the existence of humans. His idea of the "death of God" therefore, was a way of eliminating the idea of religious determinism and securing or restoring freedom to human. He attached the dualistic assumption of religious determinism by denying the existence of an objective entity called God. Rather, he sees this idea of God as a psychological creation of the human person born out of the nauseated pains of fear and trembling. This God has taken the place of human in the scheme of things; hence the religious determinists' view of a God programmed world. This God must die for human beings to regain their beingness. Nietzsche in faulting the dualism of religious determinism called for a human, all too human philosophy. A philosophy of faithfulness to the earth. A philosophy of freewill as against the deterministic philosophy of religious determinists. A philosophy of humanity as against the determinists' philosophy of God and the great beyond. Nietzsche's idea of God's death was an onslaught against the fixed morality of Christianity. All the "thou shalt nots" were killed together with God. It was an attack on every form of belief that hinders the evolutionary cum existential struggles of the human person.

We have adopted the instrumentality of the "death of God" in Nietzsche to restore the full freedom of human entities. We introduced the theory of unity existential values to resolve all issues arising from the

determinists' philosophy of religious determinism. This theory of unity existential values is slanted towards the freewill prong of the problem of freewill and determinism. The problem of religious dualism is by this theory resolved in favour of humans. The freewill and determinism debate resolved in favour of freewill, the problem of reason and faith resolved in favour of reason. The problem of human laziness and hard work resolved in favour of hard work. Our analysis shows that Nietzsche practically wrote reacting and dispelling all the positions held by the religious determinists. We align our thoughts with Nietzsche in saying that human entities should do their best to create their own existential possibilities. Human beings should look away from such metaphysical abstractions as God and return to humans where the solutions to their existential challenges lies.

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